

August 16, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. ERNEST K. LINDLEY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Here's your Berlin pamphlet back, and here are the comments of the President:

On page 3, he wants us to remove the paragraph marked X.

On page 7, delete the sentence marked X and make appropriate editorial revision of remainder.

On page 11, restate the paragraph marked X. As the paragraph now reads, it looks as if the Soviet capture of Berlin somehow came before the Western decision not to move forward in that area. Perhaps the first sentence should be the third sentence, with appropriate editorial changes.

Page 14, the President questions the need for detail on the history of the Social Democrat Mayor of 1947.

On page 15, the problems of police control in the Western sector seem to him not important.

On page 16, he would like, at point X, to remove the sentence beginning "Others had weathered the war" and replace it with a line or two about Ulbricht's own personal background as a Soviet agent.

On page 18, he questions whether the Byrnes proposals need all the detailed comment at the point marked with a question mark on this page and on the top of page 19.

On page 20, the discussion of Foreign Ministers meetings seems to him too long. A similar question arises about pages 21 through 23.

Berlin

On page 26, replace the sentence marked with an X with something like this: "Shooting down allied planes is a course which they obviously consider too dangerous to risk."

On page 28, remove "Nazi-like" at point X.

On page 31, the President questions mention of subsidies from the Federal German Republic and suggests deletion of that sentence.

On page 35, the President notes that you are planning to check carefully the statement about recognition of the East German regime.

At page 38 and page 39 there is obviously need for change as a result of the last week's events.

On page 41a, the President likes the changes pencilled in.

On page 43, in place of "financial support" we might say that the Federal Republic "plays an important part in the economy and cultural life of Free Berlin."

On page 43, the President would replace the sentence marked X with a sentence like this: "No unilateral action by one power can affect the rights of the others."

On page 49, the President would cut the remarks about the tables separated from the main table.

On page 51, he would avoid denouncing the separate peace treaty simply because we cannot prevent it.

At page 55, he would remove the word "abnormal" and make the point in another way. There is some political fog around this word because of Eisenhower's remarks at Camp David.

At page 58, again the President would cut the remarks about the separate peace treaty and concentrate attention from the threatened ending of U. S. rights. He would avoid discussion of the "salami"

- 3 -

tactics and any specific mention of Ulbricht's threat to Tempelhof. Perhaps a sentence like this would do well at point X: "Since the interests of freedom in Berlin require that these rights be sustained, there is an implicit threat of Soviet violence in this assertion, and it is here that the present position of the Soviet Union directly threatens the peace."

At page 60, the last sentence seems unnecessary and speculative.

At page 61, the clause marked X should be removed, and some other connection used to get to the last section. The President does not want to put weight on the notion that Khrushchev gave him time to settle into his job."

At page 63, the summary of Soviet misbehavior might include the rearmament of East Germany, the attempt to absorb East Berlin, the character of the Ulbricht regime, and the violations of Four-Power agreements. This is not a Presidential instruction.

On pages 64 and 65, some revision is indicated as a result of recent events.

At pages 66 and 67, the President would shorten and temper the passages about "a new order of the ages" and "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God." He feels that the temper of the document as a whole is cool and that this passage is somewhat out of key.

Finally, as I said on the phone, the President would like this paper issued not as a highlighted "White Paper," but as a sober background document for reference use by those with a serious interest in the situation behind the headlines. It should be in some regular series of similar departmental publications and should not look as if it were a parallel to our White Paper on Cuba.

McGeorge Bundy